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I Introduction
Inclusion of non-poor households or those outside
the target group' in antipoverty programmes could
appear to be a programme weakness. However, this
may not necessarily be so. Besley states that 'The
theory of incentives demonstrates that transfers to
the non-poor can be an essential part of a well-
designed cost-minimising programme' (1997:
122). Ravallion (1991) makes a similar point with
regards to the fact that a loosely targeted scheme
may be more cost-effective in reducing poverty
than one with finer targeting.2
The present article3 discusses the arguments for
and against the inclusion of 'non-target' households
in micro-credit programmes using BRAC's4 Rural
Development Programme (RDP) as a case study
This programme provides a variety of development
interventions ranging from micro-credit, training,
extension services, enterprise marketing support,
para-legal education and health and sanitation ser-
vices. However, the core ingredient in RDP's devel-
opment package is micro-credit.
An earlier version of this article was presented as a
paper at the PRUS Workshop on 'Recent Research on
Micro-Finance: Implications for Policy', in February 1998.
I am grateful to Samer Al-Samarrai, Michael Upton and
Bany Reilly at Sussex University and Mushtaque
Chowdhury at BRAC for their comments on an earlier
version of this article. I am also deeply indebted to the
field investigators and data coders of the BRAC-ICDDR.B
Matlab project, along with others from the project,
without whom this article would not have been possiblé.
2 Ravallion's comments are made in the context of
employment-guarantee schemes where the costs of
participation are in terms of foregone wage income. If
the wage rate in the employment-guarantee scheme is
set at a very low level in order to discourage the non-
poor from participating, the net poverty alleviation gain
may be lower than a scheme with a higher wage rate but
less well targeted.
This article extends the arguments developed by the
author in an earlier paper (Zaman 1997) which focused
on the determinants of participation in BRAGS RDP
BRAC is a local Bangladeshi NGO with three main
development programmes; the Rural Development
Programme (RDP), the Non Formal Primary Education
Programme (NFPE) and the Health and Population
Programme (HPP). In September 1997 there were 2.2
million members (primarily women) in RDP of which
1.9 million were borrowers. A more detailed look at
BRAGS RDP can be found in Chowdhury and Alam
(1997).
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Households with less than 50 decimals of land and
manual labour as their main occupation constitute
RDPs target group (TG). Several studies have
shown that 15-20 per cent of members belong to
'non-target group' (NTG) households (Mustafa et al.
1996; Khandker 1996; Montgomery et al. 1996).
The last study is particularly revealing. It reports
considerable heterogeneity amongst members in
terms of their pre-membership socio-economic pro-
file and suggests that intra-group differences may
even affect the access to BRAC resources by partic-
ular sections of the group. This issue is highlighted
by the case of one particular BRAC group in
Sherpur district where it appears that non-target
group (NTG) members dominate in number and
prevent the minority of poor households from bor-
rowing and taking leadership positions within the
village organisation (Montgomery et al. 1996).
Whilst village organisation members do not have
any direct power over the distribution of BRAC
inputs such as credit, they can affect a household's
chances and timing of borrowing through their own
loan repayment behaviour. For instance wealthier
members had filed loan applications earlier than the
poor members and were being irregular in their
repayments, thereby reducing the chances of the
poorer households receiving credit. Montgomery et
al. (1996) also point out that wealthier members
generally appeared to join later than poorer house-
holds, a trend found for Grameen members (Matin,
forthcoming) and as a general rule of thumb in
antipoverty programmes worldwide (Lipton et al.
1993). Hashemi (1997), using data from four vil-
lages where either Grameen Bank or BRAC were
present, shows that around 43 per cent of eligible
(target group) households did not join either organ-
isation. Of the households which did not join,
almost half were inhibited by the prospect of not
being able to repay loans and going into debt,
thereby suggesting that the poorest are more likely,
than the poor, to be excluded from these pro-
grammes. Over a quarter of women non-members
cited 'conservatism' of the male household head as
the reason for not joining. Interestingly, only 13 per
cent of non-members were refused entry by other
group members. Evans et al. (1995) in a study of
BRAC's RDP also conclude that there are barriers to
participation for the poorest households.
This background evidence raises a number of rele-
vant questions that are addressed in the article: Do
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better-off households join BRAC's credit programme
after poorer households have been selected? What
is the socio-economic profile of 'non-target group'
households and do the ultra-poor join BRAC? Do
'non-target' households prevent poorer 'target
group' households from borrowing? What are the
implications of these results for micro-credit pro-
grammes? The article forms part of a larger study
based on data collected from 547 households by the
BRAC-ICDDR.B joint research project (Bhuiya and
Chowdhury 1995) during AprilAugust 1995. The
RDP had been in place for three years in ten of the
14 villages that were sampled in Matlab.
2 Does Targeting Become Less
Strict With Time?
Using the survey data one can assess whether bet-
ter-off households join at the start of RDP opera-
tions or after a certain point in time. Table 1
presents the socio-economic profile of BRAC mem-
bers in the study region.
It is crucial to try and distinguish between the 'ini-
tial endowment' characteristics of a household and
the socio-economic characteristics which can be
attributed to BRAC. Whilst assumptions of exo-
geneity are always debatable, this article argues that
given the relatively short average membership
length (23 months), the 1995 values for depen-
dency ratio, education levels, household demo-
graphics and land can proxy for 'initial endowment'
whilst non-land assets, savings and occupational
status are likely to be affected by BRAC's credit pro-
gramme even in the 'short-run'.
Table 1 suggests that the members selected by
BRAC more recently started off less poor than the
members who joined at the start of RDP's opera-
tions; this is clearly reflected in the landholding fig-
ures. The oldest cohort of members have less land
than households who joined in the 20 months prior
to the survey (significant at the 5 per cent level).
However this pattern is by no means linear. The
21-30 month cohort appears to be the most disad-
vantaged group with relatively adverse dependency
ratios, lower education levels and value of non-land
assets. The households which were the first to join
(3 1-40 months cohort) were 'better endowed'
(higher education of the household head, higher
average education and lower dependency ratio)
Table 1: Socio-Economic Characteristics and Membership Length of BRAC Members in
Study Area
Note: * Dependency ratio is (number under nine+number over 60)/(number between 10-60).
The 'column differences' represent the significant (at 5% level) mean differences between one category and another for each
variable. For instance, columns 1(1-10 months) and 4 (31-40 months) are significantly different at the 5% level in terms of land
ownership.
Table 2: BRAC Eligibility, 'Poverty Correlates' and Borrowing Patterns
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Membership Length Differences in means and proportions
(at 5% significance)
Column number (1) (2) (3) (4) Column differences
1-10 11-20 21-30 31-40 vs. vs. vs. vs.
months months months months (1) (2) (3) (4)
(n=79) (n=127) (n=231) (n=110)
Lend owned in decimals 54.9 48.9 31.4 27.2 4 4 1,2
Value of non-land assets (tk.) 29221 26222 19886 31716 3 3 1,2,4 3
Total savings (tk.) 2137 3759 4408 6331 3,4 1 1
Earners to household size ratio 0.23 023 0.21 0.22
Dependancy ratio* 0.32 0.31 0.35 0.29 2,4 3
Age of household head 47.5 44.2 43.8 43.2 3,4 1 1
Female headed household (%) 8.9 13.4 15.1 10.0
Average education in house-
hold in years
2.02 2.08 1.35 1.87 3 3 1,2,4 3
Education of household head
in years
2.43 2.90 1.43 2.5 3 3 1,2,4 3
Manual labourer household
head (%)
25.3 29.1 26.8 17.3 4 4 2,3
Eligibility
BRAG Member TG BRAG Member NTG Non-BRAG Member
n=371 n176 TG
m'1620
Poverty correlates
Quantity of land owned (decimals) 13.70 87.91 17.13
Value of non-land assets (taka) 15943 44159 15828
Total savings (in taka) 2455 8292 2226
Proportion of household heads who are manual
labourers
0.33 0.07 0.31
Average years of education in household 1.31 2.69 1.40
Dependency ratio* 0.33 0.29 0.34
Borrowing patterns
Per cent borrowed at least once 89.2 91.1
Cumulative borrowed from BRAG 7642 7788
Average loan borrowed from BRAG 2942 3180
Average number of loans taken 2.54 2.39
Note: Includes TG non-members in the ten BRAG villages' and four 'non-BRAG villages'.
* (number under nine + number over 60) / (number between 10-60)
compared to the 21-30 month cohort which joined
immediately after. The more recent eñtrants, i.e.
those in the 1-10 month and 11-20 month
cohorts, are also significantly better off than the
2 1-30 month cohort.
It is interesting to note that the 'oldest' members
have on average the least land but also the highest
value of non-land assets. One intuitive explanation
is that borrowing from BRAC led to investment in
productive capital (e.g. rickshaw, poultry grocery
shop), thereby improving their non-land asset posi-
tion. Moreover the proportion of manual labourer
households is lower in the 'oldest' category sug-
gesting that the growth of non-land assets may have
induced a shift from on-farm activities to off-farm
self-employment. Longer membership in BRAG is
also associated with a growth in savings as shown in
Table 1, due to the requirement that members have
to save at least two taka a week. However all these
conclusions are tentative as one cannot attribute
causality using bivariate data. Even though the
trend is 'non-linear', it appears that BRAG targets
the poorest households (measured by landowner-
ship) towards the start of its operations and the bet-
ter-off 'NTG' households are likely to join later
during the course of its operations. The implication
of the presence of NTG households and their join-
ing over time are discussed in the final section of
this article.
3 How Much Better-Off are 'Non-
Target Households'?
68 per cent of BRAG members in the Matlab survey
were classified as 'target group/eligible' (TG) and 32
per cent as non-target group (NTG) by the field
investigators using their interpretation of BRAG'S
official targeting criterion5. Table 2, based on data
collected in fourteen villages in Matlab, suggests
It needs to be clarified that the eligibility data was
collected in 1995, with the typical BRAC member
having joined two years earlier and, as such, some
households could have 'graduated' from TG to NTG
status in this period and vice-versa. However, baseline
data collected in 1992 also shows that 28 per cent of
households who eventually joined BRAC were from the
NTG group. This is because unlike the 1995 data set,
the 1992 data does not have the wealth of socio-
economic information. Since the proportion of BRAC
NTG in 1995 (32 per cent) is similar to the proportion
of NTGs in 1992, the 1995 NTG group, along with
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that the BRAG-member NTG households are signif-
icantly better off compared to TG households in all
indicators of well-being. However, the average
amount of land owned by the NTG members (88
decimals) suggests that they are part of the 'mar-
ginal farmer' category Hossain (1995) shows that
61 per cent of households who have between
50-1 50 decimals of land are poor, and 25 per cent
are ultra-poor. The author points out that most
antipoverty programmes in Bangladesh cater to
households with less than 50 decimals of land and
argues that 'there is a need to bring these [marginal
farmer] households under poverty alleviation pro-
grammes' (Hossain 1995: 158). This suggests that
the majority of BRAG households who are 'non-tar-
get' are also likely to be poor or at best part of the
'vulnerable non-poor' group. Whilst Table 2 shows
that they are better off than 'target group' house-
holds, they are certainly not part of the village elite.
Section 1 discussed whether or not the ultra-poor
participate in micro-credit programmes. The Matlab
data shows that nearly half of BRAG members have
less than ten decimals of land (47 per cent) and 30
per cent have less than five decimals. The national
rural proportion of households with less than five
decimals is 17.6 per cent (BBS 1995) thereby sug-
gesting that BRAG groups have more than a pro-
portionate share of ultra-poor households. This is
also reinforced by the fact that the typical TG (eligi-
ble) BRAG member has significantly less land (at 5
per cent level) compared to a typical TG non-mem-
ber, as shown in Table 2.
An obvious question at this stage is whether 'non-
target' households join at the expense of 'target'
households. Evidence from the ten villages in
Matlab where BRAG intervenes suggests that 59 per
cent6 of eligible households did not join BRAG, but
there is no information about whether they did not
their socio-economic characteristics, is used as a proxy
for the households who were 'mistakenly-targeted' by
BRAC over the course of the 1992-95 time period.
6 In these ten 'BRAG' villages there are 896 'target group'
households of which 371 have joined BRAC. Note that
Table 2 includes households from all 14 villages in the
Matlab survey so the TG non-member category includes
households who could have joined but did not, and
households who are not in the 'BRAC' villages and so
could not join even though they are 'eligible'.
want to join or whether 'non-target' households
were selected instead of them. This issue is dis-
cussed in detail in the concluding section.
4 Do 'Non-Target' Households
Borrow More?
Montgomery et al. found one BRAC group where
wealthier households were making it difficult for
poorer members to borrow This section explores
whether this theme can be detected in the ten BRAG
groups in this sample.
The indicators used to measure 'participation depth'
are whether the household ever borrowed or not,
total credit obtained from BRAG for those who did
borrow, the average loan size and the average num-
ber of loans taken. Table 2 shows the extent of any
differences between eligible (1G) and non-eligible
(NTG) BRAG members using these indicators. The
comparison of means suggests that NTG members
borrow larger amounts, as measured by the average
loan size compared to 1G members. The difference
is small but significant at the 1 per cent level. The
cumulative borrowed figure is however not signifi-
cantly different between the two groups. The aver-
age number of times a household has borrowed
from BRAG is only just not significant at the 10 per
cent level (p = 0.125), and, interestingly, we find
that 1G members appear to borrow more fre-
quently In other words 1G members tend to bor-
row smaller amounts but more often; these
offsetting effects result in the cumulative figure
being very similar.
The message that emerges from these figures is that
apart from a marginal difference in average loan
size, there does not appear to be a difference in the
borrowing patterns of 'better-off' and 'poor' BRAG
households. There is therefore no evidence in
Matlab to support the claim that the presence of
NTG households inhibits the borrowing behaviour
of TG members.
5 Concluding Discussion
We now turn to some of the possible implications of
the earlier findings for micro-credit programmes
focusing on the issue of 'non-target' households.
The findings in this article indicate that better-off
(non-target) households tend to join BRAG later
than poorer (target group) members. One possible
explanation is that the pool of 'target' households
who wish to join becomes saturated and as a result
'non-target' households are included. However, evi-
dence of significant numbers of households who
could have taken part, but did not, suggests that
this cannot be the whole story. Pressures exerted by
target-group members themselves to include some
influential NTG households may compel pro-
gramme administrators to 'relax' the official target-
ing criterion.7 These pressures could arise due to
poor members wanting to get a wealthier household
involved in RDP in order to tide over loan repay-
ment difficulties within the group. As Mosley
(1996) points out when analysing Banco Sol in
Bolivia, these transfers from better-off to poorer
borrowers are not necessarily 'altruistic' as they are
often in the form of loans. Moreover, there may be
powerful factions within the village who could dis-
rupt the daily operations of RDP if their representa-
tives are not given access to BRAG'S inputs.
Whilst the general 'community approach' has been
tried and discarded by BRAG due to the impression
that the elite were benefiting most, the 'target group'
approach may have to be flexible enough to incor-
porate a number of socially influential households
to maintain a link with the other socio-economic
classes in the village. This line of argument fits in
with Besley's (1997) model which shows that the
inclusion of the non-poor may be necessary to a
limited degree in order to avoid them capturing
more benefits which are meant for the poor.
Another reason for the inclusion of 'non-target'
households may be the perception that they are bet-
ter credit risks than poorer households. They are
also more likely to deposit more savings and
demand larger loans thereby improving a branch's
self-financing ratio. However the 'loan absorptive'
capacity of these NTG households is still a matter to
be looked into as it will determine the full extent of
This is a view expressed during conversations with BRAC programme administrators and field staff.
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the revenue-earning potential for a micro-credit
organisation.8 One crucial consideration in all this is
the extent to which NTG members are above the
eligibility threshold, If the NTG household is mar-
ginally above the cut-off point, then the inclusion
may simply be merited on the grounds that BRAG'S
land and occupation-based eligibility criterion is
not perfectly correlated with poverty and that there-
fore the households could be below the poverty
line. The evidence from Matlab suggests that in fact
there is a strong possibility that the typical 'non-tar-
get' BRAC member is either poor or part of the 'vul-
nerable non-poor' group. If the policymaker's
objective is to reduce the proportion of people
below the poverty line, then targeting the moderate
poor and even the vulnerable non-poor may be jus-
tified (Ravallion 1991). If the aim is to reduce the
severity of poverty, then incentives for the poorest
sections need to be targeted.
The proportion of 'mistakenly targeted' households
that is permissible is also an important issue in this
discussion. There is a fine line between allowing
non-target households in the programme, based on
the various aforementioned arguments, and tilting
the TGNTG balance to such an extent that the
poor are marginalised within the credit group
(Montgomery et al. 1996). The evidence in this arti-
cle suggested that the poorer members' borrowing
patterns were not affected by the presence of 'non-
target households'. This could be due to the fact
8 A further argument that can be made to include non-
target' households is that they have the potential to
create employment opportunities for the poorest by
setting up smalllmedium-scale enterprises. BRAC has
recently set up a new project lending to 'graduated' or
NTG members with proven entrepreneurial ability in
order to creste such enterprises. The average loan size is
around ten times more than the typical micro-credit
loan and the loan screening and monitoring process is a
combination of micro-credit and formal banking
methods.
Raval1ion comment on the positive correlation
between increasing wage-rates and greater mis-targeting
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that the TGNTG balance was still in favour of the
poorer group. The 'ideal' composition of a group
that is targeted by an antipoverty programme ought
to be in line with the extent of the benefits that dif-
ferent households derive from participation. The
benefits may range from increased economic secu-
rity (in minimalist credit programmes) to a combi-
nation of higher literacy, greater economic security,
greater legal awareness etc. (in 'integrated credit'
programmes). The merits or drawbacks of includ-
ing 'non-target' households depends crucially on
the extent that they benefit compared to 'target'
households. If, for instance, 'target' households
benefit less than 'non-target' households, the target-
ing strategy may have to trade off reaching the poor-
est with 'low benefit', and including non-target
households but with 'high benefit'.'° This decision
in turn is dependent on the weight the policymaker
attaches to reducing the incidence or severity of
poverty
The central argument of this article is that the inclu-
sion of 'non-target' households in micro-credit pro-
grammes is not necessarily a sign of programme
weakness. The costs and benefits of mis-targeting
depends on the proportion of 'non-target' house-
holds, the extent that they are 'non-target', the
extent that they benefit relative to, and at the
expense of, 'target' households and the relative
importance of reducing poverty incidence versus
severity
in employment guarantee schemes can be extended to
the micro-credit context in terms of a potential trade-off
between loan size and accurate targeting. If an overall
reduction in the numbers below the poverty line is an
increasing function of average loan size, then the
inclusion of a larger number of non-poor households,
due to the participation incentives offered by higher
loan sizes, may outweigh the benefits of improved
targeting achieved via low loan ceilings.
° In BRACs 'integrated credit programmes' this trade-off
is complicated by the fact that the benefits will vary, as
described earlier, due to the multitude of interventions
apart from credit.
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